This paper provides a model for sovereign default risk valuation in which a sovereign country endogenously determines the timing of default on its external debt. The theoretical relationships between credit spreads and the macroeconomic factors considered in the model are consistent with the empirical literature. The model explains the variation across time in Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) spreads to a degree not offered by existing theoretical and empirical models. I use daily price data information on stock market indices to compute credit spreads for Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia over the period 1998 -2008. The out-of-sample analysis focuses on the subprime crisis period from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2008. The model explains 32% of the out-of-sample time variation in EMBI+ spread changes. The enhanced explanatory power of the model is due to a transformation of the non-linear relationship between observed EMBI+ spreads and daily stock market prices into a linear relationship between the model spreads and EMBI+ spreads. The inclusion of additional variables (VIX, S&P 500 return, and U.S. Treasury Rate) raises the explanatory power to 45%. I also show that accounting for a time-varying sovereign's incentive to default can best explain the level of EMBI+ spreads, especially during during the recent period of distress. JEL Codes: F34, G12, G13, G15 wide economic conditions appear to be successful and necessary in the explanation and the prediction of the dynamics of sovereign credit risk. This finding may partially change interpretations of the results of Longstaff et al. (2007) and Pan and Singleton (2008). These authors show that credit risk movements are mostly attributed to changes in common factors across countries.
Introduction
This paper provides a model for evaluating sovereign default risk. The model explains variation across time in Emerging Market Bond Index 1 (EMBI+) spreads better than existing theoretical and empirical models. It also highlights theoretical relationships between credit risk and other macroeconomic variables that are consistent with the existing literature. The importance of correctly evaluating sovereign credit risk is clear, given the important role played by sovereign debt in financial markets. Sovereign foreign debt is currently the largest asset class in emerging markets, representing approximately $5,500 billion of principal in 2007 (FT, 2007) . This debt has also been at the center of a number of international lending crises.
I generate estimates of daily credit spreads for Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia over the period 1998 -2008 and compare these estimates to observed EMBI+ spreads. I rely on price data on country stock market indices, which measure a country's economic performance, to generate daily credit spreads. Stock market prices exhibit severely non-linear relationship with EMBI+ spreads. The contribution of the paper resides in the development of a structural model that breaks down the non-linearity in this data in order to generate estimates of credit spreads that are linearly related to EMBI+ spreads. A first-passage time model with a constant endogenous default boundary, which captures the sovereign's incentive to default, characterizes the benchmark framework. I also extend this model to allow for a time-varying incentive to default that depends on both country specific and macro wide economic conditions. I estimate the model parameters over the period from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2006 . The out-of-sample analysis consists of the subprime crisis period from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2008. Regarding the results, changes in the estimated credit spreads explain 32% of variation across time in daily EMBI+ spread changes over the out-of-sample period. 2 The explanatory power rises to 35% when accounting for the option-implied volatility index (VIX) as an additional time-varying factor, and to 45% when additionally considering the return on the S&P 500 and the 5 year U.S. Treasury rate. However, the benchmark model is weak in the explanation of the level of observed credit spreads. In contrast, accounting for a conditional incentive to default significantly improves the explanation of the sample characteristics of EMBI+ spreads, in addition to explaining the time-variation. The results hold during both quiet times and during the recent subprime crisis period. Hence, information on both country-specific and market 1 JPMorgan, one of the major dealers in the Brady market, derives the credit spread implied in the price of each Brady bond. The company computes each country's EMBI+ index, which is a weighted average index of spreads using the country's most liquid Brady bonds. A focus on Brady bonds rather than other emerging market instruments is likely to improve the analysis of credit risk as they are by far the most liquid and the largest emerging debt market. 2 In contrast to the existing empirical literature, this paper only explores the dynamics of credit spread changes. An analysis on credit spread levels would raise severe nonstationarity issues. have greater or lower incentive to default. In comparison, Yue (2006) obtains that renegotiation necessarily increases credit risk. Finally, I provide intuitive theoretical relationships between the endogenous recovery rate upon default and the macroeconomic fundamentals previously mentioned. This paper builds on the foundation laid by important prior work. One body of literature, launched by the seminal contributions of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , addresses why sovereign lending takes place by focusing on the costs of future access to credit, trade, and financial markets, as well as on retaliatory actions by way of sanctions. However, these frameworks do not provide a clear understanding of why or when a sovereign country defaults. In response to this lack of clarity, a second body of study has emerged. Gibson and Sundaresan (2001) , Westphalen (2002) , and Francois (2006), for example, offer a model for evaluating sovereign debt in the presence of strategic default using a contingentclaims framework. However, these studies do not analyze the dynamics of credit spreads. In contrast, a more recent body of literature (Yue, 2006; Arellano, 2008 ) draws on dynamic stochastic equilibrium models to explain the dynamics of Argentinean spreads using quarterly GDP data. Finally, Bodie et al. (2007) and Gapen et al. (2008) suggest using higher-frequency forward-looking data on the economy, as provided by market prices. They use domestic debt prices to infer the market value of sovereign wealth, which is then used to derive daily indicators of sovereign credit risk on foreign debt.
The approach considered in this paper merges these four bodies of literature. Default is triggered when the level of the sovereign country's assets (determined by the present value of future sovereign country's revenue) falls below an endogenous default boundary dependent on economic fundamentals of the sovereign country. The daily market value of a sovereign country's assets is proxied using that country's stock market index, which is a forward-looking measure of future corporate income. I do this, because the sovereign country's revenue comes almost exclusively from corporate tax income in emerging markets. I thus depart from Merton's (1974) approach, which was developed for corporate debt valuation. Within my model, equity is not viewed as a liability on the sovereign balance-sheet equal to the residual value of that sovereign country's assets after the promised payments to debt holders have been made; rather, equity is viewed as a proxy for the market value of the sovereign country's assets. There are two reasons for this. First, since equity is not a source of sovereign financing, it cannot be a liability. Second, by the very nature of sovereign default, sovereign debt is not an assets claim. Combining an intuitive theoretical model with market valuation, this paper provides a framework that determines the timing of sovereign default and, thus, the price of sovereign debt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a theoretical understanding of endogenous default policy for a sovereign country. In Section 3, I offer some of the model's theoretical predictions for the relationships between sovereign credit risk, the recovery rate upon default, and its determinants. The model is then applied to EMBI+ spread data in Section 4. I conclude my analysis in Section 5.
The Model
Throughout the analysis, I assume that capital markets are frictionless and that all investors have perfect information on the state of the economy. All variables are measured in the currency of the lenders. The default-free term structure is flat with an instantaneous riskless rate r, at which investors may lend and borrow freely.
I consider a sovereign country with an infinite lifespan. The country is constituted of a representative unlevered firm, which generates a stream of operating income denoted by X. Corporate taxes are paid to the sovereign at a rate τ on operating cash-flows. The value V of the sovereign country's assets is determined by the unlimited value of a perpetual claim to the current taxed operating income, which I define by V t = E Q ∞ t τ X u e −ru du . The firm's equity is a tradable asset and its price is defined by
the assets of the sovereign country can be synthetically replicated by investing in the firm's equity share. The sovereign country's assets are then indirectly tradable, and the markets are complete. 11 The value of the sovereign country's assets (V t ) t≥0 is governed under the risk-neutral measure Q by the process
where the process Z Q t is a Brownian motion defined on the probability space (Ω, F , Q). The standard
The volatility of the diffusion process is given by σ.
The sovereign country can choose to default on its debt obligations. According to standard default clauses in sovereign debt contracts, the sovereign loan is assumed to be in default when the sovereign country fails to pay the debt service on schedule. 12 Most defaults occur during economic downturns (Reinhart et al., 2003 and De Paoli et al., 2006) . As such, a sovereign country may strategically default on its debt obligation when its assets fall below a level V B < V 0 . Reorganization of the debt contract with lenders is initiated at 11 In Merton (1974) , the dynamics of the firm's assets is unobservable and inferred from stock market information. Instead, I view the sovereign country's assets as observable and tradable. 12 Default clauses contain more details and allow for other sources of default. For instance, a grace period of 30 days is generally considered. Leaving the IMF as a member country is legally considered as defaulting on the debt. Nevertheless, the simple definition adopted here also corresponds to that of Standard and Poor's. 13 I first evaluate the price of sovereign debt for a given default boundary V B and then determine the selected threshold endogenously.
The Price of Sovereign Debt
I assume an infinite maturity debt contract, 14 characterized by a level D and a continuous debt service c until default. The pricing formula of sovereign debt D does not require knowledge of either investor tastes or beliefs about the expected growth rate of the sovereign country's assets. Furthermore, the pricing formula must avoid arbitrage opportunities. That is, from a standpoint of market completeness, a portfolio strategy that holds underlying assets V , debt D, and risk-free assets can be modified to be riskless and thus avoid arbitrage by picking appropriate weights such that the expected return on the portfolio equals the risk-free rate r. Using Itô's lemma, the value of the perpetual debt satisfies
where D V and D V V are the first and second derivatives, respectively, of the sovereign debt value D with respect to the sovereign country's assets V . The solution to this ordinary differential equation is subject to a number of conditions. First, when the sovereign country's assets V tend to infinity, the value of the sovereign debt tends to the value of risk-free debt
Second, lenders must evaluate the foreign debt upon default; this evaluation depends on the recovery rate. That is, upon default, the sovereign country and its lenders restructure the terms of the debt contract and agree on a reduction in the debt service. I determine the value-matching conditions that impose equality between the value of the sovereign debt and the value of the restructured debt upon default. At default time T (V B ), the value of the sovereign debt is
where 0 ≤ 1 − φ ≤ 1 denotes the recovery rate on the debt service c. I assume that the sovereign country 13 Sovereign countries do not tend to default once but several times (Reinhart et al., 2003) . Generalizing the framework to account for multiple defaults is left for future research.
14 With a perpetual debt, the sovereign country borrows at the same time it repays the principal on the previous debt. The sovereign country then proceeds to a continuous roll-over of its debt. cannot increase its debt after default.
The value of sovereign debt is associated with the relevant boundary conditions (Eqs. 3 & 4) :
where β is the negative root of the quadratic equation
The market value of sovereign debt D(V ) is equal to a riskless perpetual debt with continuous coupon c minus a default premium. This premium corresponds to the present value of the unrecovered value of the debt after default, where the stochastic discount factor is defined as the Arrow-Debreu price of
β . Lenders anticipate the opportunistic behavior of the sovereign country by reflecting the associated wealth extraction in the pricing of sovereign debt.
Optimal Default Boundary and Credit Spread
Defaulting incurs economic costs that may occur upon default. First, debt repudiation can impede the ability of the defaulting sovereign country to trade, as empirically documented by Rose (2005) . 15 This is pertinent, since Frankel and Romer (1999) show that trade is a significant part of economic growth. Second, default weakens the domestic financial system. As major creditors of the government, domestic banks may be prevented from competing their intermediary duties of providing liquidity and credit to the economy. 16 De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta (2006) show that the recent major default crises have been associated with banking crises, which often result in severe and prolonged recessions. More generally, Reinhart et al. (2003) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) provide ample evidence that the costs of defaulting on external debt can be significant for economic activity. I assume that in the event of default, the sovereign country 15 As argued by Rose (2005) For given debt service c, recovery rate 1 − φ, and default boundary V B , sovereign wealth W (V ) equals
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (9) is sovereign wealth in the absence of default. The second term is the difference between the reduction in debt service and the loss upon default multiplied by the Arrow-Debreu price of this event. The sovereign country's default policy is characterized by the default boundary V B . It is chosen to maximize sovereign wealth W (V ), 18 such that the smooth-pasting condition
The incentive to default early, as expressed in the model by increasing V B , is to lower the expected value of debt repayment. However, debt holders take this opportunistic behavior into account in the market valuation of debt. On one hand, for a given debt service c, the market value of debt D(V ) decreases with V B . On the other hand, the expected loss upon default also rises with the incentive of defaulting. The sovereign country must consider this trade-off when determining its default policy.
Under the risk-neutral measure, the sovereign country's assets grow at the risk-free rate, whereas the default boundary remains constant. The probability of defaulting thus vanishes over time, which may not be a desirable property. Instead, under the assumption that the sovereign continuously issues new debt with coupon c t = c 0 e rt , the default boundary grows at the same rate as the assets. Mathematically, that case corresponds to a stationary environment with a fixed debt service, such that β simplifies to 1 2 − 1 4 + 2r σ 2 . I will further refer to this model as the model with exponential default boundary, in contrast to the model with constant boundary. 17 Bulow and Rogoff (1989) suggest two additional reasons for a country to repay its foreign debt. First, lenders may be able to appropriate collateral. However, in the event of repudiation, the assets accessible to creditors are worth only a small fraction of the outstanding level of debt (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989) . Second, they consider a reputation effect, which will impact future borrowing opportunities, though empirical support for such an effect is weak (Eichengreen, 1987) . Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2004) provide evidence that sovereign countries are able to regain market access as soon as three and a half months, on average, after defaulting. 18 Prior studies have not settled the debate on what exactly the objective function of the sovereign country should be. Here, W (V ) corresponds to the part of the economy controlled by the sovereign country on behalf of its citizens, as lenders are foreign investors by assumption. Gibson and Sunderasan (2001) consider that the sovereign country has an objective function that is linear in total country wealth W (V ) + D(V ). In Westphalen (2002) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , the sovereign country seeks to maximize terminal total country wealth.
The market yield spread is a measure of the market's perception of default risk. Under the risk-neutral measure, the credit spread is obtained for two fundamental reasons. First, there is a risk of default. Second, in the event of default, the lenders receive only a fraction of the promised payments. The credit spread is defined as Yue (2006) shows that accounting for endogenous renegotiation upon default between the sovereign country and its lenders helps to (partially) explain the high level of credit spreads. The sovereign country benefits from restructuring debt by avoiding economic sanctions. It has greater incentive to default, which thereby increases credit risk. I then extend the model in order to analyze how debt renegotiation affects a country's creditworthiness.
Modeling with Endogenous Recovery Rate
I first make a few additional assumptions. When default occurs, lenders take collective action and renegotiate with the sovereign country regarding debt reduction at no cost. Essentially, the renegotiated debt can be considered as a value-redistribution between the sovereign country and the foreign debt holders.
The rule of sharing the sovereign country's assets upon default results from a Nash bargaining game, as The basic logic behind the renegotiation process is presented here; see the Appendix for a full derivation.
Should the debt agreement fail, lenders lose their initial investment such that D(V ) V =V B ,φ=1 = 0. In response, the sovereign country faces direct sanctions upon default that would increase the loss on its assets by a factor, k. However, by renegotiating debt reduction, the inefficient sanctions can be lifted, and the lenders can recover part of the defaulted debt, with
. Thus, both parties have an incentive to renegotiate the terms of the debt contract. The endogenous recovery rate 1 − φ * of the debt service satisfies
where 0 < η < 1 is the sovereign bargaining power in the renegotiation game.
Comparative Statics with Macroeconomic Factors
The pricing models developed above can be used with scenario and simulation analysis to evaluate the effect of shocks and policies on credit risk. This section explores the sensitivity of sovereign credit spreads with respect to macroeconomic variables ( Figure 1 ). I provide predictions on credit spreads assuming both a constant and an exponential default boundary. As Figure 1 suggests, the qualitative predictions are identical under both assumptions. The parameter values, presented in Table I , reflect the situation of Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia over the 1998 -2008 period (sources are cited in the last column of Table   I ). 
Credit Spreads in the Benchmark Model
The Figure 1 provide empirical evidence that the exports-to-GDP ratio negatively affects sovereign spreads in emerging market economies.
Renegotation, Credit Spreads, and Recovery Rate
I now investigate how accounting for the renegotiation process influences credit risk. As Figure 1 suggests, the qualitative predictions are very similar to those of the benchmark model. The sovereign country does not necessarily exhibit greater incentives to default when the renegotiation outcome is endogenous.
The potential for debt restructuring provides lenders with valuable protection against loss only for some specific parameter values. In particular, the generation of credit spreads higher than the benchmark credit spreads necessitates levels of sovereign bargaining power upon renegotiation η above 90%. Thus, in contrast to Yue (2006) , accounting for renegotiation upon default may not necessarily generate higher levels of credit spread.
I also explore the relationship between the obtained recovery rate and the model's macroeconomic parameters. As illustrated in Figure 2 , the theoretical recovery rate decreases with macro-volatility σ and risk-free interest rate r. The model also suggests that the greater the sovereign bargaining power upon renegotiation η, the lower the recovery rate is upon default. When powerful countries such as Argentina Figure 4 ).
The success of the model will be evaluated by its ability to transform the non-linear relationship between economic performance and the observed credit spreads into a linear relationship between the estimated credit spreads and EMBI+ spreads. 
Methodology
As noted in Section 2, the level of the sovereign country's assets V can be written as a function of the
This linear relationship calls for the consideration of the country's daily stock market index price S i,t as a proxy for the (unobservable) daily value of that sovereign country's assets V i,t . Normalizing the sovereign country's assets to unity, the computed stochastic discount factor is country i at day t is determined by
where
The parameter values only account for information made available during the in-sample period. The risk-free rate r is determined by the average 5-year U.S. Treasury rate (see Table I ). In contrast, the recovery rate 1 − φ, the expected level of haircut φc, the cost of defaulting λ, and the expected volatility parameter σ are unobservable input. I estimate these parameters by minimizing the tracking error volatility between the changes in estimated credit spreads and the changes in EMBI+ spreads over the period 1998 -2006.
These parameters are determined as follows
where CS EM BI and CS M odel stand for the observed EMBI+ spreads and the credit spreads estimated by the model, respectively, for country i at time t. I report the estimated values in Table II . The indicator c λ i captures the sovereign country's incentive to default: it increases with the quantity of sovereign debt to be repaid and decreases with the economic costs of defaulting. As it can be expected, the incentive to default is found to be more pronounced for the two defaulters, namely Brazil and Russia, than for Mexico and Peru. 21 The recovery rates obtained from this estimation, with an average recovery rate of 36%, are also consistent with those observed in the data. Moody's (2006) reports a value-weighted recovery rate on defaulted sovereign issuers of 33%. In particular for Russia, the average recovery rate on government bonds was 18% in 1998, which is equal to the recovery rate implied by the estimated model. As such, the model is in line with the data. Table III exhibit a very high correlation between the daily estimated credit spreads and daily EMBI+ spreads. The average correlation is 0.90 in levels and 0.46 in changes. In comparison, the average correlation between the stock market index prices and EMBI+ spreads is −0.30 in levels and −0.09 in changes. Hence, the pricing formula developed in this paper significantly contributes to the enhancement of the relation between EMBI+ spreads and information on stock market data. Figure   5 displays the time-varying correlation between changes in the estimated spreads and changes in observed EMBI+ spreads, as computed using the Dynamic Conditional Correlation model developed by Engle and Sheppard (2001) . 22 The correlation is quite stable over time, suggesting that the results are not specific to a particular sub-period. to evaluate the quality of the pricing model using a single measure, namely the overall R 2 . To avoid any nonstationarity concerns, the investigation considers changes in the estimated and observed credit spread using the following specification
where I account for country-specific coefficients of elasticity δ i to allow for heterogenous relations across countries. In addition, ω i characterizes country-specific effects and ν i,t is the error term. I correct the heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors to account for temporal and cross-sectional dependence in the panel data using Driscoll and Kraay's (1998) extension of Newey and West's non-parametric variance covariance estimator. 23 Finally, regressions are estimated with a Random Effect model. 24
If the model is correct, the estimates of δ i obtained from the above regression should be equal to unity.
As displayed in Table IV , these estimates are very close to one. More importantly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that δ i = 1. The second result that Table IV exhibts is that changes in the estimated credit spread can significantly explain the time variation in EMBI+ spread changes (see Analyses 1a, 1b, and 1c).
The explanatory power corresponds to 17%. This result is in line with that of the corporate literature.
In comparison, using much more variables, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) show that the fcators that should, in theory, determine corporate credit spread changes have an explanatory power of 25%. 
Global Economic Factors
The results reported in Table IV suggest Pan and Singleton (2008) show that the VIX is the key factor in explaining 23 Economic and financial integration imply substantial interdependencies between emerging market economies. As a result, cross-sectional dependence may arise due to the presence of common shocks and unobserved components that become part of the disturbance term. If common factors are unobserved (and uncorrelated with the included regressors), the standard Fixed and Random Effects estimators are consistent. However, the estimated standard errors are biased. 24 The choice of the appropriate model is determined here using the Hausman specification test. This test compares the Fixed versus Random Effects under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model. Within this specification, the individual effects are uncorrelated (and thus Ho is not rejected). A Fixed Effect model would produce biased estimators, violating one of the Gauss-Markov assumptions, so a Random Effect model is preferred here. sovereign credit risk movements.
Consistent with these studies, the average correlation between the level of the VIX and the level of EMBI+ spreads, using the data set of this paper, is 29%. Figure 5 shows the conditional correlation between EMBI+ spreads and the VIX for the four countries. This correlation is very similar across countries and appears to be important, although generally lower than the correlation between the EMBI+ spreads and the estimated credit spreads. Following the aforementioned studies, I consider the VIX to be an additional explanatory variable. The results suggest that the VIX has only limited scope to explain additional time variation in the daily EMBI+ spreads (see Table IV , Analysis 1b), although its coefficient is statistically significant. The inclusion of the VIX merely raises the explanatory power from 17% to 18%. I also consider additional global factors that are likely to explain the time variation in the EMBI+ spreads. 25 The first explanatory variable is the daily 5-year U.S. Treasury rate. The second variable is the daily return on the S&P 500 index. The results in Table IV show that the U.S Treasury rate and the conditional stock market return in the U.S. improve the quality of the estimation only slightly (see Analyses 1b and 1c). The analysis thus suggests that, over this sample, most of the information contained in these common factors (VIX, return on S&P 500, and U.S. Treasury rates) are already factored in the country-specific stock market prices.
Credit Spreads Estimated with Quarterly Accounting Data
Instead of considering market prices, Yue (2006) and Arellano (2008) analyze the dynamics of quarterly sovereign credit spreads using information provided by quarterly GDP data in a stochastic general equilibrium model. Yue (2006) However, both the credit spread and the GDP series are typically nonstationary, which can raise severe nonstationarity issues. Hence, it would not be appropriate to compare the econometric results presented so far with those obtained in these studies.
Nevertheless, I here follow Yue (2006) and Arellano (2008) in the computation of the estimated credit spread using quarterly GDP data, a proxy for the sovereign country's assets. In Figure 8 , I compare the 25 I have also considered the effect of the sovereign country's stock market volatility, computed as the conditional volatility of the stock market log returns using an AR(3)-GARCH(1,1) process. This variable was not found to improve the results and has then been dropped for space consideration. dynamics of the credit spreads estimated by the model with those of the EMBI+ spreads for the period 1998 -2006. The estimated model parameters are presented in Table II . The model and observed spread series evolve very closely over time. Figure 9 plots the changes of the estimated credit spreads and the EMBI+ spreads. Again, these changes are very similar. The average correlation between these two series is 72% in levels and 60% in changes (Table III ) , which is consistent with Yue (2006) and Arellano (2008) .
Then, the estimated credit spreads based on GDP data seem to explain a substantial part of the time variation in quarterly EMBI+ spreads. However, these data are only available quarterly and, moreover, are reported with a lag. They also provide an ex-post measure of economic performance, whereas sovereign credit spread is a forward-looking market measure. In light of this, stock market prices certainly constitute a more useful determinant for estimating credit spreads. First, investors' opinions usually reflect the best available, forward-looking data on the economic prospects of a given country. Second, market prices are available at a higher frequency. Third, it appears important to incorporate sentiments on the economy as reflected in stock market prices in the estimation of sovereign credit risk. 
Time-Varying Incentive to Default
where, for each country i, the constant country-specific volatility parameter σ i is computed as the unconditional volatility of the daily log returns on the corresponding stock market index over the period 1998 -2006. The recovery rates 1 − φ i are those estimated in Section 4.1 and presented in Table II . The Figure 10 plots the dynamics of the implied incentive to default for Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia over the period 1998 -2006. The results suggest that the incentive to default is clearly time-varying. 
where ε t denotes the heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors corrected with the Newey and West's approach. The Table VI have a very close dynamics (see Figure 10 ), except for Russia.
The sovereign country's incentive to default appears to be, on average, both country-specific and marketwide procyclical through the positive effect of stock market prices and the negative influence of the VIX. Under the assumption of a conditional incentive to default, the credit spread CS T V B M odel for country i at day t is determined by
Indeed, the
where the coefficient estimatesα i,t are computed using the increasing information set F t−1 , which incorporates information from January 1, 1998 through time t − 1. As displayed in Table VII imports coupled with decreasing commodity prices have negatively affected firms' earnings in the emerging world. As the model predicts, lower fiscal revenues for governments have been accompanied by a severe rise in sovereign credit risk. Figure 11 and Table VII [about here] I now investigate the prediction of the model credit spreads computed under the assumption of a constant incentive to default, which is estimated over the in-sample period (1998 -2006) . As displayed in Table IV 1a, 1b, and 1c) . The explanatory power corresponds to 17% and 32%, in-and out-of-sample respectively. In line with the results above, Analyses 2b and 2c also suggest that additional market-wide variables can significantly improve the out-of-sample predictions.
We can thus conclude that both approaches provide similar results when explaining credit spread changes.
However, this is no longer the case when the model is used to explain credit spread levels. The difference is particularly striking in Figure 11 . In Due to the strong assumption of a constant incentive to default, this approach appears unsuccessful in the replication of the sample characteristics of daily EMBI+ spreads. However, under the assumption of a conditional incentive to default, Table V provides clear evidence that the model credit spreads present sample characteristics that are very close to those observed in the data, besides successfully explaining and predicting the time variation in EMBI+ spreads. In addition to the understanding of the mechanism behind a sovereign country's decision to default, the importance of accounting for a time-varying incentive to default, which is affected by economic conditions, is then evident. 
The time variation in the distance-to-default indicator captures 93% of the movements in the levels of daily EMBI+ credit spreads for Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia (see Analyses 4a, 4b, and 4c in Table   VII ). Closely related to a sovereign country's probability of defaulting, the distance-to-default measure appears to be a good indicator of that country's creditworthiness. In addition, the inclusion of a conditional incentive to default enhances the results provided by the simple distance-to-default measure. Therefore, the approach developed in this paper seems to be crucial in the explanation of both the dynamics and the level of sovereign credit spreads.
Conclusion
Default should not be viewed as exogenous to a sovereign country's decisions but rather as an optimal outcome. This paper develops a dynamic model of sovereign country default that determines the timing of default. The analysis also recognizes the role of strategic interaction between the sovereign country and its lenders. This paper merges both the theoretical and the empirical credit risk literature. One advantage of the model is that it offers an intuitive theoretical framework for understanding why and when a sovereign country defaults. Second, the model provides closed-form formulae for the recovery rate, credit spread, and 27 Following Moody's KMV, the distance-to-default measure has been widely considered an indicator of credit risk (Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2007; Duffie, Saita, and Wang, 2007; and Bodie et al., 2007) . This measure computes the difference between the implied forward market value of the sovereign country's assets and the default boundary scaled by the standard deviation of the sovereign country's assets. The distance-to-default measure DD i,t for country i at time t thus captures how many standard deviations the sovereign country's assets are away from default, which is defined by
price of sovereign debt. Third, the theoretical predictions of the relationship between credit risk and other macroeconomic factors are consistent with the existing literature. This allows for diagnosis of movements in sovereign credit spreads through changes in these variables. Fourth, the estimated credit spreads can successfully capture the time variation in the changes of EMBI+ spreads for Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia over the period 1998 -2008. Last, but not least, the paper shows that accounting for a time-varying incentive to default, which depends on both country-specific and market wide economic conditions, can successfully explain the sample characteristics of EMBI+ spreads. The framework developed in this paper thus lends itself to numerous pricing applications.
Appendix

Renegotiation Game
I present the renegotiation game between the sovereign country and its lenders and derive the recovery rate upon default 1 − φ. Sovereign debt D(V ) is priced in Section 2 using a default boundary V B that now accounts for the renegotiation process.
I first determine the allocation of the renegotiation surplus between a sovereign country and its lenders.
The surplus represents the benefits of renegotiating the debt contracts compared to a full repudiation. For any debt reduction φ, sovereign wealth upon default is
In case of full repudiation (φ = 1), the sovereign country saves c(1−φ) r . However, direct sanctions are imposed by its lenders, magnifying the loss in sovereign wealth by a factor k. De Paoli et al. (2006) show that countries that do not restructure their debt face a median fall in economic activity that is several times larger than those which do. Under full repudiation, sovereign wealth satisfies
The difference between Eq. (23) and Eq. (24) represents the surplus on the sovereign side and equals
On the lender side, the recovered debt value at default
which determines the debt holders' surplus ∆D(V ) V =V B .
The expected value of debt is null if full repudiation applies D(V ) V =V B ,φ=1 = 0 . In Merton (1974) , the value of the debt at default equals the residual value of the firm. I depart from this case, since there is no formal international bankruptcy court that would allow the debt holders to seize part of the existing assets. In addition, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) suggest that the sovereign assets that would be accessible to creditors in the event of repudiation are negligible relative to the outstanding level of debt. Finally, parties would not be able to write a contract to guarantee a payment upon default. Nothing would then prevent the sovereign country from deviating at default, thus not honoring the contract.
I consider a Nash bargaining game to determine the recovered debt upon renegotiation. The sharing rule for the renegotiation surpluses upon default satisfies the Nash solution characterized as
On one side, the sovereign country benefits from a smaller loss. The sanctions imposed in the case of full repudiation are avoided. However, it must continue to pay a fraction of the debt service. On the other side, debt holders benefit from receiving the recovered debt service. The outcome of the renegotiation process allocates both surpluses between the sovereign country and its lenders according to their bargaining power.
I assume that there is a unique bargaining power for all lenders, which necessitates coordination between creditors, through the London or the Paris Clubs for example. This modeling assumption is in line with Hayri (2000) , François (2006) , and Yue (2006) .
As long as both parties have some bargaining power (0 < η < 1), there is a unique reduction φ * of the debt service that maximizes the surplus allocation between the two parties:
The solution of φ * does not have a distribution support between 0 and 1, at least given the assumed specification. There is a lower boundφ in the debt reduction, below which renegotiation is never observed.
For the sovereign country to be willing to renegotiate, the costs of bearing the new debt service must not outweigh the benefits of reduced economic sanctions. The lower thresholdφ = {φ ; ∆W (V ) V =V B = 0} denotes the point of indifference between renegotiating or not.
Credit Spread with Endogenous Recovery Rate
Accounting for the endogenous recovery rate derived above, the credit spread is
where the default boundary V R * maximizes W (V ), along the usual smooth-pasting condition, and is defined by
and the debt reduction upon default is Table II . Table II . Table II . Table II . 
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